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ABSTRACT
The current study was to examine the limiting factors of earnings management for companies’
listed Tehran stock exchange. The study was a kind of applied, descriptive-correlative research.
All listed companies in Tehran stock exchange were selected as statistical population during
2009 to 2013. So, data was gathered by library method and collected by systematic eliminated
sampling method. The results show that there is a significant inverse relationship between board
size and earnings management in companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange. The result doesn’t
show any significant relationship between dividend and earnings management in companies’
listed Tehran stock exchange.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are two main motives for earnings manipulation (earnings management). One of them is
investment encouraging for buying firms’ stock and the other one is increasing in firms’ market value
(Klag, 1991). One of the ways for earning manipulation is using accruals.
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Because, accrual accounting system offers right to managers in order to choose earnings determinant in
different times. In accrual accounting system, managers face different options about the time of revenue
and expenses recognition. For example credit sale is early recognition of revenue (Teoh et al, 1998). This
kind of manager performance is called earnings management. Manager earnings manipulation decreases
earning quality. Managers adjust reported earnings by choosing specific accounting policies,
accounting estimates and accrual management.
Hant, Moier and Shelvin (1997) suggest that lower reported earnings increase capital market
value. Obviously, integration in financial statement is affected by manager personal opinion for
decreasing earnings number. Earnings management has negative impact at the time of detection.
By earnings management accounting, manager can change others’ imagination about firm
performance. When some errors are detected the firm cannot be reliable, so the debt and capital
price will be decreased (Sahar Sepasi, 2005).
2. Theoretical framework
Manager intervention in accounting information has been named variously. The common term of
this issue in accounting and financial literature is earnings management. Shiper (1989) describes
earnings management as manager intervention in external financial reporting process in order to
reach personal earnings. Earnings management phenomenon is rooted in manager opportunistic
behavior. In fact, earnings management is a kind of managerial performance that retrieved from
accounting and agency theories, so leads to information asymmetry between managers and other
users (investors). In the other hand, earnings management can be investigated in efficient market
theories. Hence, managers are motivated to earnings manipulation (Wats & Zimmerman, 1986).
Nowadays, earnings management determinants and information discloser in capital market has
been interesting (Fernandez & Garcia, 2007). In fact, the reason for earnings management is so
important for policymakers, analysts, specialists and finance executives (Banish, 1999; Kuthary
et al, 2005).
Kapland described the ability of decreasing or increasing in reported earnings by managers as
account manipulation. Account manipulation has wider concept. For example, the way of items
categories in income statement is so considered in accounting literature. The importance of
account manipulation is more than Kapland description. Manipulation incentive needs more
attention. Managers sometimes use accounts as an instrument for showing unreal firms target or
artificial risk reduction.
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Estimates of the power and actions of managers are the one of the fundamental factors for
earnings management test. The investigation of literature based on earnings management show
the existence of different approaches in estimation of managers’ power to earnings
determination. One of the most important approaches is based on discretionary accruals. Healy,
DeAnjelo and Jones examined earnings management and the use of accruals for earnings
management detection. So they suggest some models for future research. Dechow et al show that
Jones adjusted model detect earnings management in a better way.
Jones recognizes the difference between earnings and operating cash flow as accruals. This
approach shows that the operating cash flow information is more objective criteria for firm real
economic performance measures and hasn’t been manipulated. Jones (1991) assumed that non-
discretionary accruals are fixed during the time period. The model tries to separate discretionary
accruals and non-discretionary accruals and control the effect of entity economical situation on
non-discretionary accruals.
The current study is to examine the limiting factors of earnings management for companies’
listed Tehran stock exchange.Among different type of management, income, smoothing and
income payments management is more important. The main issue is that managers use flexibility
made from accounting standards in order to manipulate earnings. When firms have high
performance income and produce more, the personal commitment will be increased (decreased).
There are deferent kinds of intensives for these actions consist of tend to understand the impact
of risk factors for sale, maintain dividend policy and Achievement of employee objectives in the
context of the theory of agency and compensation (Greenawalt and Stinkey, 1988; Healy and
Wahlen, 1999).
2.1 Limiting factors of earnings management
Control mechanisms might limit earnings management. Beasley (1996) and Bradbery (2006)
showed that there is an inverse relationship between board size and discretionary accruals.
Earnings management is so important because of its protective features for investment. Laporta
et al (2000) in their study indicate that there is a positive relationship between shareholder
protection and dividend.
Zarvin & Cohn (2010) investigated SEOs earnings management behavior focused on accrual and
real action manipulation during 1987-2006. They used cross-level Jones model (1991) in order to
measure earnings management based accruals (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Soubramaniam,
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1996). And they used operating cash flows, discretionary spending and the cost of product in
order to measure real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006). They suggest three chapters
in literature by the combination of SEO earnings management and real earnings management.
First, they predicated firms that use real earnings management as well as accrual earnings
management. Second, they showed the variation of firms intensive to compare real earnings
management with SEO accrual earnings management. They found that firm election is changed
as a function of firm capability to use of accrual management and its costs predictably. That was
the first model about that how firms can make balance between real earnings management and
accruals earnings management.
The third and most important one is that they investigated the effects of earnings management
strategies on post-SEO performance efficiency. They found that the reduction of Post- SEO
performance efficiency for real activities is more intense than accruals management. That shows
reduction of Post- SEO performance efficiency is motivated by reverse accruals (Rengan, 1998;
Theo et al 1998). And also reflect real outcomes of operating decisions about SEO earnings
management. All-told, their finding shows the reliability of SEO earnings management. In the
following in order to better understanding of the relationship between real earnings management
and accrual earnings management, this issue will be discussed extensively.
3. Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between board size and earnings management
for companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange.
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between dividend and earnings management for
companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange.
4. Research variable
4.1 Dependent variable:
Earnings management: in the current study Jones adjusted model by Dechow et al (1998) is used
in order to measure earnings management.= 1 + (∆ − ∆ ) + +
: Firm total accrual
Firm total assets∆ − ∆ Changing in cash revenue
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Property
4.2 Independent variable
Board size: the log of the number of board member is used in order to measure this variable.
Dividend policy
4.3 Control variables:
Book to market ratio is considered as control variable.
5. Research domain
Subject domain:The investigation of limiting factors of earnings management for companies’
listed Tehran stock exchange.
Locative domain: companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange.
Time domain: the years during 2009-2013
6. Statistical population and sample:
Statistical population and data has been selected considering following restrictions and
systematic elimination method:
1) Be acceptable in stock market since 2009
2) The end of financial year is 19th March.
3) The companies being in manufacture industry and In order to ensure comparability of
their activity do not invest and finance in companies such insurance and banks.
4) The financial year has not been changed during financial period.
5) The firms which have available information necessarily during the study period.
6) Be acceptable in stock market until 2013
7. RESEARCH METHOD
The current paper is a kind of descriptive – correlative study. That is a descriptive study because
it describes and recognizes conditions or phenomenon. And the study is correlative because it
investigates the correlation between variables and seeks to prove the relationships based
historical data. So, the current study can be categorized as a post event study cause of
investigating cause and effect. In this paper there is a significant relationship between variables
and the variables are not manipulated.
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8. Model:_ = α + β + β + ε_ = α + β + β + ε
9. RESULTS
9.1 Chow test or the test of structural changes in hypothesis:
In order to test hypothesis, first of all time fixed effect models are estimated and then structural
changes test is used for investigating significance difference.
Hypothesis Cross sectional
cut
statistics Freedom degree significance
1 F 0.352696 (120,176) 0.5834
Chi-Square 49.349496 Chi-Square 0.4792
2 F 0.632612 F 0.9980
Chi-Square 81.476446 Chi-Square 0.9840
10. Durability test for research variable






Size -27.0402 -3.21542 252.929 454.520
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Board -8.14710 4.57846 161.703 25.4116
0.0000 0.0565 0.0956 0.0000
DIV -53.5100 -17.1990 382.486 512.600
0.0000 0.0192 0.0001 0.0000
BMV 334.908 -31.0729 -5.84646 340.925
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000






























 H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and earnings management for
companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange._ = α + β + β + ε
:0H There is not any significant relationship between Dis-accruals and Board
:1H There is a significant relationship between Dis-accruals and Board




fixed 1.121297 0.321746 3.485043 0.0005
Board size -1.592533 0.456951 -3.485126 0.0005
Book to market
ratio






























According to table as the amount statistic Dourbin - Watson test is 2.13 and model index in alpha
error level is more than 5%, so the assumption of the lack of correlation between errors is
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accepted and the Regression model can be used. The amount of adjusted determination
coefficient is 13% which indicate that 13% of changes in total research dependent variable
depend on independent and control variables in this model. According to significance of t
statistics there is significant relationship between board size and earnings management for
companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange.
 H2: There is a significant relationship between dividend and earnings management for
companies’ listed Tehran stock exchange.
_ = α + β + β + ε
:0H There is not any significant relationship between Dis-accruals and DIV
:1H There is a significant relationship between Dis-accruals and DIV




Fixed 0.19057 0.157890 1.501901 0.1412
Board size -0.126133 0.101239 -1.245899 0.2314
Book to market
ratio
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According to table as the amount statistic Dourbin - Watson test is 1.2 and model index in alpha
error level is more than 5%, so the assumption of the lack of correlation between errors is
accepted and the Regression model can be used. The amount of adjusted determination
coefficient is 8% which indicate that 8% of changes in total research dependent variable depend
on independent and control variables in this model. According to significance of t statistics there
isn’t any significant relationship between dividend and earnings management for companies’ listed
Tehran stock exchange.
14. Study limitations:
 For measuring earnings management by using accruals, some of the accruals because
registration is not included in the calculation.
 In calculating fixed asset ratio, some of the items reflected in the balance sheet have not
been properly recorded by companies or reflected in current assets. The diagnosis of this
issue has not been possible for authors.
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